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This paper investigates whether developed countries export taxes to developing countries, 
contributing to the deterioration of their terms of trade and welfare; that is to what extent 
the distribution of gains from trade is being affected not by existing tariffs in developed 
countries, which are already at low levels, but by their domestic taxation. An eight-region 
CGE model for the world economy is used. The results indicate that developed regions 
export capital taxes to developing regions. However, the effects of import tariffs on welfare 
and terms of trade are larger than those of domestic taxes. 
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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether developed countries export taxes to developing 
countries, contributing to the deterioration of their terms of trade and welfare. Developing countries 
have become increasingly integrated into world commerce. Since the beginning of the 1990’s most 
developing countries have undertaken radical changes in their trade regimes. Trade negotiations 
have mainly concentrated on multilateral tariff reductions and in giving preferential treatment to 
developing countries, and hence helping them to improve their welfare. However, so far the role of 
domestic taxation in affecting the distribution of gains from trade has been overlooked. Hence, the 
purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the distribution of gains from trade is being affected 
not by existing tariffs in developed countries, which are already at low levels, but by their domestic 
taxation. 
Toward this end, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy is 
built in which existing domestic taxes and import tariffs are eliminated and replaced by an equal 
yield non-distorting tax. The model consists of eight regions: the United States (USA), Japan (JAP), 
the European Union (EU), other developed countries (ODC), developing America (DAM), 
developing Africa (DAF), developing Asia (DAS), and developing Europe (DE).Regions have a 
production and a demand structure, and they are linked through trade. Further, the model explicitly 
includes domestic taxation and commercial policy. Domestic taxation comprises taxes such as 
corporate tax, property tax, payroll tax, social security contributions, income tax, and a tax on final 
expenditure. Commercial policy is represented by import tariffs.  
To our knowledge, the issue of tax exporting among countries has not been analysed 
empirically, although Mutti and Morgan (1986), and Morgan et al (1996) have looked at tax 
exporting among regions within the United States. One of the few analyses in this area is Whalley 
(1980), who investigates the strength of relative price effects in international trade caused by the 
different domestic factor taxes which operate in the United States, the European Union, and Japan. 
Whalley uses a four-region general equilibrium model (the fourth region being the rest of the 
world), which incorporates tariffs, non-tariff barriers and domestic taxation policies of major 
trading blocks, using data for 1973. This author finds that domestic factor taxes can induce very 




important in distorting international trade than traditional instruments of commercial policy, such as 
import tariffs.
1 
This paper differs in one important respect from Whalley (1980). There is a distinction 
between developed and developing regions, and more importantly both groups have been divided 
further into four sub-groups. The advantage of this additional disaggregation is that it helps to 
identify from which region(s) developing sub-groups are likely to import taxes. Developed regions 
have more commercial ties with some particular developing regions than with others, and so their 
domestic tax policies may affect one developing region more than another. It is worth mentioning 
that developed countries main trading partners are developed countries themselves, and this inter-
developed regions trade may weaken tax exporting effects. In 1990, for example, 65% of the United 
States exports were destined to Japan, the European Union and other developed countries, whereas 
less than 16% were destined to developing America and developing Africa (these figures are taken 
from the benchmark data set). 
According to the results, the replacement of capital taxes by an equal yield non-distorting 
tax in developed regions generates welfare gains and terms of trade improvement in developing 
countries, when capital is internationally mobile. In this case, the replacement of this tax reduces 
the return to capital, as this factor moves into developed regions, and this in turn reduces the cost of 
producing exports (i.e. developing countries imports are cheaper). This result suggests that 
developed countries were exporting capital taxes to developing regions. In addition, it is found that 
JAP exports income taxes to developing regions, although the effects on welfare and terms of trade 
are small. The effects of import tariffs on welfare and terms of trade are larger than those of 
domestic taxes. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the theoretical underpinnings of 
the study. Section 3 describes the basic structure of the multiregional computable general 
equilibrium model. Section 4 presents the empirical implementation, including the description of 
the benchmark data set and the calibration of the model. Section 5 presents the results of the model 
as well as the sensitivity analysis. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
                                                 




2. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE STUDY 
Tax exporting refers to the shifting of tax burdens from domestic residents to non-residents of the 
taxing jurisdiction; it is also known in the theory of international trade as the terms of trade effect 
(see e.g. Dixit and Norman, 1980; Woodland, 1982; Bhagwati et al, 1998).  
The existing literature on tax exporting has concentrated in the exportation of state and 
local taxes to other regions within the same country. This literature has also focused on issues such 
as foreign tax credits (e.g. Damus et al, 1991) and deductibility of state and local taxes with 
multilevel governments (e.g. Wildasin, 1987a). 
McLure (1969) is one of the first authors that analysed tax exporting in the context of a 
general equilibrium framework.
2  McLure addressed the question of the extent to which the burden 
of taxes levied by state and local governments is borne by non-residents of the taxing jurisdiction. 
In order to do this, he presented a theoretical general equilibrium analysis of interstate incidence of 
several types of general taxes levied in one state in a larger nation.
3 The key assumption in 
McLure’s analysis is that labour is completely immobile between states; also, capital is assumed to 
be perfectly mobile in response to interstate differentials in rates of return, and the geographic site 
of residence of both workers and capitalists is assumed to be fixed. McLure concludes that, under 
the restrictive assumptions of his model, “...the degree of net tax exporting on the side of sources of 
income depends upon the change in the return to capital resulting from the tax in question and the 
extent to which the non-taxing state is a net debtor or creditor” (p. 481). On the uses side, 
“...interstate tax exporting depends upon how the tax alters the terms or trade of the non-taxing state 
and the amount of the product of the taxing state bought by non-residents” (p. 482). 
This kind of tax exporting can be significant when the regions’ producers and/or consumers 
are non-negligible in size relative to the market for some particular commodity (a good or a factor). 
In this case, the government will have an incentive to tax exports or imports in order to restrict trade 
and to achieve improvements in the region’s terms of trade. Oates (1972) points out that a common 
form of tax exporting could be the imposition of a tax on restaurants and hotel bills in tourist 
centres. 
                                                 
2 In this case, the general equilibrium framework matters because the author is considering interstate mobility 
of factors, and this assumption is likely to be of considerable importance in determining interstate tax 
incidence.  
3 These general taxes include: taxes on all labour employed in the taxing state, on all capital invested in the 
state, on all production of the state, on the consumption of all domestically produced goods, on all imports, 





One implication of tax exporting is that it is commonly believed that the presence of tax 
exporting reduces the effective cost of public services, by pushing some of the burden on to non-
residents, and thus creating an incentive to increase public expenditure. This issue has been 
analysed by Wildasin (1987b), who shows that the additional revenues could be collected from 
exported or non-exported taxes without affecting the marginal cost of public funds. Furthermore, 
Wildasin (1987a) points out that if tax exporting affects spending, it will do so by creating an 
income effect and by affecting the marginal excess burden of non-exported taxes. 
In a paper evaluating the literature on interregional exporting and importing of state and 
local taxes within the United States, Mutti and Morgan (1986) indicate that tax exporting may result 
in lower tax rates since public services could be partly financed by non-residents. In the long run tax 
exporting can also have effects on the levels of income and employment within the taxing region, in 
the patterns of resource use and on the location of economic activity across regions, since the lower 
tax rates may attract footloose industries and other mobile factors to the region. The inflow of 
factors can result in rapid growth of the tax-exporting region (see e.g. Oates, 1972, 1991; Mutti and 
Morgan, 1986). 
Little empirical work has been done on tax exporting among countries. Damus et al (1991) 
evaluate tax exporting between Canada and the rest of the world. They develop a numerical general 
equilibrium model in order to highlight the importance of tax exporting in determining the welfare 
effects of tax changes in open economies. In their model the authors emphasise the importance of 
including foreign tax credits when modelling the supply of foreign capital.
4 In this context, tax 
exporting occurs either through a change in the terms of trade or through a change in the net return 
paid to foreign-owned capital employed in Canada. Damus’ et al measure of the aggregate welfare 
change (∆ W) resulting from a given tax change includes a tax exporting effect  (TEE) and an 
efficiency effect (DWL), that is, 
DWL TEE W + = ∆ , [1] 
where ∆ W is calculated as the sum of equivalent variations across income groups; TEE captures the 
possibility of exporting tax burdens to non-residents (foreigners); and DWL is the efficiency effect 
(dead-weight loss or gain) associated with a given tax change, which captures the impact on 
resource allocation resulting from any change in the overall pattern of taxation in the economy. 
                                                 





The results of Damus et al (1991) indicate that tax exporting effects may be as significant as 
efficiency effects in evaluating potential reforms. Furthermore, efficiency effects may be influenced 
by the way foreign capital flows are modelled. 
More recently, Morgan et al (1996) analyse long-run exporting and importing of regional 
taxes using a six-region general equilibrium model of the United States. They conclude that the 
ability of states to export taxes does not necessarily promote economic growth or welfare. In 
addition, factor tax exporting depends on regional ownership patterns and the determinants of factor 
prices, such as factor mobility, factor intensities, and elasticities of substitution in production. 
As indicated above, the literature we have reviewed mainly focuses on the exportation of 
state and local taxes to other regions within the same country, with the exception of Damus et al 
(1991). In what follows, we investigate whether developed countries export factor taxes to 
developing countries, contributing to the deterioration of their terms of trade and welfare. 
 
3. THE MODEL 
The general equilibrium model used to analyse tax exporting is a standard multicountry 
model that incorporates domestic tax structures in each region. The model is static and consists of 
eight regions, each one with a demand and production structures. The regions are linked through 
trade. Each region has three industries, each of which produces a single output. There are two 
factors of production (namely labour and capital) which are used as primary inputs. There is a 
representative consumer in each region and, for simplicity, intermediate production is not 
considered.  
Commodities are considered to be qualitatively different from similar commodities 
produced abroad. This is the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969), widely used in 
international trade applied general equilibrium analysis, to account for the presence of cross hauling 
in international trade data. In addition, the use of the Armington assumption rules out complete 
specialisation, and allows us to establish the strength of the terms of trade effect by introducing 
estimates of trade elasticities (Whalley, 1985). 
  Production in the model exhibits constant returns to scale and firms are perfectly 
competitive, so that prices equal marginal costs of output. In each region each industry uses labour 
(L) and capital (K) as inputs. The production structure in each industry is summarised in Figure 1 

















A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function describes the substitutability 
between L and K into value added for each industry in each region. More formally, the value added 
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where  Qi
r is the value added in industry i in region r; γ i
r  is a constant defining units of 
measurement; δ i
r is a share parameter; σ i
r is the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
in the production of good i. 
Each industry selects an optimal level of inputs that minimises the cost of producing Q 
units of output. Further, each industry in each region produces a commodity that can be transformed 
either into a commodity sold on the domestic market, or into an export according to a constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET) function. In a second stage, exports are allocated across regions 
according to a sub CET function. 
Factors are non-produced commodities in fixed supply in each region. It is assumed that 
both factors are mobile across industries within the region. Regarding international factor mobility, 
labour is assumed to be internationally immobile because of restrictions to international labour 
mobility. As to capital, in global models international mobility is usually ignored (e.g. Whalley, 
1985; Shoven and Whalley, 1992). However, in their analysis of domestic tax policies and the 




can substantially affect the results of the model.
5 In addition, capital markets are becoming more 
integrated internationally. Hence, it seems appropriate to assume that capital is internationally 
mobile.
6 
  Turning to the demand side of the model, consumers within a region are assumed to 
have identical homothetic preferences. This assumption allows us to consider a representative 
consumer, endowed with all the labour and capital in the region. The consumer maximises a nested 
CES utility function subject to the regional budget constraint. The nesting structure used for each 
region in the CES final demand function is summarised in Figure 2, and the complete set of 
equations and notation that defines the demand side of the model is presented in Appendix 1. 
  




















At the top level, consumers decide how much to spend on goods from each sector given the 
regional budget constraint. Consumers demand a composite of similar imported and domestically 
produced goods. At the second level, the consumer determines domestic and aggregate import 
expenditure in each sector according to a CES function.
7 At the third level, purchases of imports 
from each region are selected in each sector, according to a CES function.
8  
The budget constraint in each region is given by income equal expenditure  (I
r = E
r), where 
income is derived from factor ownership, government transfers and the region’s trade surplus (or 
                                                 
5 See Gasiorek et al (1992) for a presentation of a multicountry computable general equilibrium model with 
perfect international capital mobility. 
6 Whalley (1985) mentions that the absence of international factor mobility follows the tradition of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin literature. This assumption can be crucial for model results, since factor mobility can be a 
substitute for trade. Moreover, “… factor flows in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework can equalise relative factor 
endowments across countries, removing the source of trade. Global gains from liberalised factor mobility, … , 
can thus be just as important as global trade liberalisation” (Whalley 1985, p.36). 
7 The substitution between comparable domestic and composite imports determines the price elasticity of 
demand for imports. 





deficit). On the other hand, the region’s expenditure includes the amount spent on the goods as well 
as taxes paid. 
The model also incorporates some policy elements that may have regional effects, such as 
factor, income and consumption taxes, as well as import tariffs. Domestic taxes, especially factor 
taxes, affect the cost structure of domestic output. Since part of this output is exported, the degree of 
tax exporting will depend on how much the price of the exported output is increased by the 
domestic tax, and the fraction of output purchased by non-residents.
9 
  Factor taxes are modelled as ad valorem taxes on the use of factors of production, and so 
will affect the price paid by producers. These taxes are exported mainly due to intersectoral effects. 
Income taxes are modelled as an ad valorem tax on taxable income. This tax is paid by 
residents and cannot be exported. However, it seems appropriate to consider this tax in the 
formulation of the model, since in some countries there exists double taxation of corporate income, 
that is at the firm and shareholders levels. 
Consumption taxes are modelled as ad valorem taxes on final consumption, and therefore 
affect the price paid by consumers. Consumption taxes cannot be exported since the possibility of 
commuting is not considered; that is, in the model workers purchase goods in the region where they 
live. These taxes are included because in the counterfactual experiments, domestic taxes are 
eliminated and replaced by an equal yield non-distorting tax on final expenditure. 
Import tariffs are modelled as an ad valorem tax on imports, with rates varying across 
commodities. Import tariffs are not exported, but are used to alter the terms of trade of a country 
with respect to its trading partners. Finally, all tax revenues raised are assumed to be transferred 
back to consumers. 
Once the model has been specified, it can be solved for an equilibrium solution. A general 
equilibrium in the model can be interpreted in the usual Walrasian sense as a set of goods and factor 
prices for which all markets clear. That is demand-supply equalities hold in each goods and factors 
markets; zero profit conditions hold for each industry in each region; and each region is in external-
sector balance.
10 Appendix 1 formally presents the full set of equilibrium conditions of the model. 
Next, we calculate the parameters of the model that are consistent with the benchmark data set; 
these parameters allow us to reproduce the data set as an equilibrium solution of the model. Then, 
we compare counterfactual equilibria with the benchmark equilibrium generated by the data. 
                                                 
9 This is what McLure (1969) refers to as tax exporting from the uses side. 
10 In this model, this condition states that the value of exports minus the value of imports, that is the trade 
surplus (or deficit) remains fixed in real terms. The trade balance is not equal to zero, since this involves 





4. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
The model consists of eight regions, each of which engages in both domestic and foreign trade 
activities. No internal trade among the countries of any region is included. These regions were 
chosen to reflect world trade. Instead of having two big regions called “developed countries” and 
“developing countries”, it was decided to split each group into four sub-groups. The advantage of 
this additional classification is that it allows us to consider from which region(s) developing sub-
groups are likely to “import” taxes. Developed regions were chosen to represent the main trading 
areas in the developed world, that is the United States (USA), Japan (JAP), the European Union 
(12-member-EU), and the remaining developed countries were grouped in other development 
countries (ODC). Developing regions comprise a heterogeneous group of countries, and were 
chosen according to their geographical location, that is developing America (DAM), developing 
Africa (DAF), developing Asia (DAS), and developing Europe (DE).
11 Table 1 presents the 
grouping of individual countries. 
The regional classification described above is important since domestic tax policy in 
developed regions may affect one developing region more than another. Also, developing regions 
have more commercial ties with one developed region than with others. For example, the USA is 
the main market for developing America due to its proximity, as it is the case between Japan and 
developing Asia. The European Union is the main market for African products, not only because of 
their proximity but also because there are still colonial ties and institutional agreements (e.g. EU-
ACP). Lastly, developing Europe is increasingly trading with the European Union mainly as a result 
of the opening up of the countries in Eastern Europe, and the possibility of enlargement of the 
European Union.  
In the model, each region is assumed to produce three commodities: primary commodities 
(including fuels), manufactured goods, and services. It is also assumed that each region’s 




                                                 
11 Initially, developing Oceania (which included Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
and Vanuatu) was included as a ninth region. At the time of solving the model I encountered numerical 
problems because this region was very small compared to the others (in 1990 its GDP accounted for only 




4.1 BENCHMARK DATA SET 
The benchmark data set involves data on value added by component by industry, domestic taxes, 
foreign trade and import tariffs. Given that the model considers a representative consumer in each 
region, the final demand for domestic products is equal to gross output minus exports, whereas the 
final demand for imported products equals imports. 
The size of the eight regions is given by their respective GDP, in 1990 US dollars, as 
reported in the World Tables (World Bank, 1995). The benchmark data set satisfies the equilibrium 
conditions of the model in the presence of the existing policies. Data from National Accounts as 
compiled by the United Nations, World Tables produced by the World Bank, and the Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook of the International Monetary Fund were used. Regarding foreign trade 
statistics, we use information from UNCTAD (1995) and the GATT-trade policy review.
12 
In the model, both commercial and domestic tax policies are considered. Commercial 
policy is represented by import tariffs, applied in ad valorem form; tariff collections are part of the 
government’s revenues.
13 As to domestic taxation, factor, income and consumption taxes are 
incorporated in the domestic transactions of each region. Factor taxes include corporate and 
property taxes, treated as taxes on the use of capital by industry, and payroll taxes and social 
security contributions, treated as taxes on the use of labour by industry.
14 Income taxes are treated as 
taxes on consumer’s taxable income. Consumption taxes include value added tax, sales tax and 
some specific taxes on consumption. All taxes are in ad valorem form. Lastly, foreign tax credits 
are not included in the model. 
Tax rates are calculated by dividing tax revenues (as taken from the benchmark data set) by 
the model tax base, obtaining an average effective tax rate. For simplicity, in applied general 
equilibrium models it is assumed that marginal tax rates equal the observed average tax rates. The 
collection of tax revenue in developing countries is often limited by their administrative capacity 
and political constraints. One consequence of this is that direct taxation plays a much more limited 
role in developing than in developed regions. Hence, developing regions exhibit a heavier reliance 
on indirect taxation, especially taxes on international trade. 
                                                 
12 An appendix with the sources and the procedure followed to assemble the data set is available from the 
author upon request. 
13 Import tariffs were included because of their effect on both regional terms of trade and welfare. 
14 From the available data it was only possible to calculate one tax rate by factor tax in each region. Since 
intersectoral effects play an important role in the model, the data set was also modified to include differential 
tax rates by industry in order to assess the sensibility of the results (An appendix with the procedure followed 




During the nineties there have been some changes in tax policy (International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation, various years). The general trend has been towards reduced rates of personal 
income tax and corporate tax. There has also been a shift towards indirect taxation as a mean of 
collecting revenue. Some countries with fiscal difficulties (e.g., Japan, Thailand, Pakistan, the 
Middle East countries) have chosen to rely on indirect taxation either by increasing the tax rate or 
by broadening the tax base. Other countries (e.g., Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Ghana) 
have introduced VAT, and in some other cases (e.g., Japan, Pakistan, Thailand, Ivory Coast, Niger) 
VAT systems have been simplified by reducing the number or rates. The general trend among Latin 
American countries has been the increase of VAT. In Central Europe changes have also been made 
in with a view to harmonising corporate taxation and VAT with the European Union. 
Regarding direct taxation, the general trend has been to protect the tax base, often 
accompanied by reduced or at least stable tax rates. Also, anti-avoidance / anti-evasion measures 
have been strengthened in order to deal with international tax avoidance and new business practices. 
Perhaps as a result of the increased competition brought about by globalisation, one of the main 
features world-wide has been the enactment of measures design to attract investment (exemptions 
and other tax concessions), sometimes limited to specific sectors (e.g. the oil sector in Nigeria). The 
Netherlands have introduced tax incentives in order to make the investment climate more attractive: 
these include the extension of incentives to research and development activities, by allowing 
accelerated or free depreciation for certain new assets, and relaxing significantly its ruling policy. 
Virtually all countries in the world continued to expand their tax treaty networks, 
particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and several countries have been reducing their import 
tariffs in the continuing move towards freer markets. 
 
4.2 CALIBRATION AND ELASTICITIES 
Once the data set has been assembled, some parameter values, such as share parameters and scale 
parameters, can be directly calculated from the equilibrium conditions of the model, following the 
procedure described in Mansur and Whalley (1984). Because of the CES/CET functional forms 
used in the model, some parameter values for the elasticities of substitution and the elasticities of 
transformation need to be specified. Then, on the demand side, share parameters can be obtained 
from demand functions. On the supply side, share and scale parameters can be obtained from cost 
functions. 
The results of the model are dependent on the values selected for the elasticities of 




trade policies. These terms of trade effects, together with production and consumption effects, 
which also depend on the elasticities chosen, determine the welfare effects of any policy change. 
Sensitivity analysis is performed around the values chosen.  
On the demand side, the model involves elasticities of substitution in consumption between 
composite goods; elasticities of substitution between comparable imported and domestically 
produced goods; and elasticities of substitution between imported products. In this case, the 
elasticities used are based on price elasticity estimates, since it was not possible to find econometric 
estimates of elasticities of substitution for CES demand functions. The elasticity of substitution 
between composite commodities was set equal to one in all regions; these elasticities imply Cobb-
Douglas demand functions. 
The elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and domestically produced 
goods (υ ) was set equal to literature estimates of import price elasticities (see Table 2). Within each 
region the same value was assumed for all commodity-substitution possibilities. Lastly, since 
substitution between import types forming import composites determines the export price elasticity 
faced by the region, the elasticity of substitution between imports forming import composites (ζ ) 
was set equal to estimates of export price elasticities obtained from the literature (see Table 2). 
Shiells and Reinert (1993) point out that estimated Armington elasticities are low; thus, 
there are large terms of trade effects losses associated with trade liberalisation. They also state that 
the value chosen for the elasticity of substitution among imports from different sources clearly 
affects trade, terms of trade and the welfare effects of bilateral tariff reductions.  
The Armington assumption has been criticised by Brown (1987), in the sense that it may 
imply large terms of trade effects regardless of the size of the country. Brown also shows that the 
terms of trade effect would increase in magnitude, the larger the elasticity of substitution between 
comparable imported and domestically produced goods, and the smaller the elasticity of substitution 
between import types. 
Regarding the supply side, the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital (σ ) is the 
key parameter of the value added functions. Elasticities of factor substitution by industry based on 
those used by Whalley (1985) are used. With regard to the elasticities of transformation for 
domestic output (ρ ), it was not possible to find econometric estimates, so that the elasticities of 
transformation estimated for Ecuador by de Janvry et al (1991) were used. The strong assumption 
adopted here is that the same elasticity values apply by industry for all the regions in the model. 
Finally, it was not possible to find econometric estimates of the elasticity of transformation for 




one. Once all parameters have been specified, the model can be solved for counterfactual 
experiments. The model was solved using a routine we wrote in GAMS. 
 
5. MODEL RESULTS 
In this section a set of simulations is performed to investigate whether developed countries export 
taxes to developing countries. Seven counterfactual experiments are carried out in which existing 
taxes and import tariffs are eliminated and replaced by an equal yield non-distorting tax. These 
experiments involve the elimination an replacement of: i) capital taxes; ii) labour taxes; iii) all 
factor taxes; iv) import tariffs; v) all factor taxes and import tariffs vi) income taxes; and vii) all 
factor taxes, import tariffs, and income taxes. The equal yield non-distorting tax is a destination-
based tax on final expenditure within the region.
15 Whalley (1980) points out that the introduction of 
an equal yield non-distorting tax may not be very realistic. However, it allows us to appraise the 
effect domestic taxes may have on both welfare and terms of trade of the region’s trading partners. 
The counterfactual experiments were performed individually for USA, JAP, and EU, and 
for all developed regions simultaneously.
16  
After each change was introduced, a new equilibrium was calculated and the results were 
compared with the benchmark equilibrium. We are mainly interested in the impact of each policy 
change on the regional terms of trade and on welfare. The terms of trade were calculated for each 
region in its trade with all other regions, and correspond to a quantity weighted price index giving 
the relative price of exports and imports. The quantity weights used correspond to those associated 
with the benchmark equilibrium. A reduction in the price of a region’s exports relative to that of its 
imports implies a deterioration in the terms of trade of the region, whereas an increase in this 
relative price implies a terms of trade improvement. 
The welfare effects of the policy changes are measured by the Hicksian Equivalent 
Variation (EV) for each region, where a positive EV refers to a welfare improving change and vice 
versa. A positive EV could be the result of the removal of domestic distortions that affect producer 
and/or consumer decisions. Distortions to producer decisions are caused by the effects of taxes on 
                                                 
15 The possibility of using an origin-based tax was not considered because the introduction of this kind of tax 
may increase the price of domestic output, and in consequence the price of exports. 
16 Counterfactual experiments were also performed for the region comprising other developed countries 
(ODC). These results are not reported since we are interested in tax exporting from developed to developing 





producer prices, whereas distortions to consumer decisions are caused by the effect differential 
factor taxation can have on output prices. 
The welfare effects will be decomposed according to equation [1] into a tax exporting effect 
(TEE) and an efficiency effect (DWL) (Damus et al, 1991). TEE is measured as: 
M M E E P ˆ V P ˆ V TEE − = , 
where VE and VM correspond to the initial values of exports and imports, respectively; and  E P ˆ  and 
M P ˆ denote tax-induced percentage changes in the producer prices of exports and imports, 
respectively. Then, from [1] it follows that efficiency gains (losses) are given by the difference 
between the aggregate welfare change and the tax exporting effect, that is: 
DWL = ∆ W – TEE. 
DWL captures the impact a change on the overall pattern of taxation in the economy has on 
resource allocation.  
If a region is exporting domestic taxes to another region, one would expect that an increase 
in such taxes will cause a deterioration in the terms of trade of the importing region as well as a 
welfare loss. For the exporting region an improvement in the terms of trade is expected, but the 
welfare effects could go either way. That is, the exporting region could experience a welfare gain or 
loss, because with the increase in the tax an additional distortion is introduced. The final result will 
depend on whether the terms of trade effect or the efficiency effect dominates. 
A priori one might expect that the USA is mainly exporting taxes to DAM, since the former 
is the main trading partner of the latter; similarly, JAP is expected to export taxes to DAS, while EU 
is expected to export taxes to DAF and to a lesser extent to DE. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results. In  these experiments, capital will move in response to 
changes in its rate of return.  
  When labour taxes are replaced (see Table 3), the price of labour falls so that producers in 
USA, JAP, and EU demand more of it. However, labour is in fixed supply in each region, so that 
the price of labour goes up again in order to eliminate the excess demand. When labour taxes are 
unilaterally replaced in USA and EU the welfare gains in these regions account for $0.7 and $0.4 
billions, respectively, that is approximately 0.01% of GDP; the terms of trade improve by 0.1% in 
USA and 0.04% in EU. These gains are comprised of $2.5 and $0.3 billion tax exporting effects 
(gains for the regions) and $1.8 and $0.2 billion efficiency losses. These two regions attract capital 
from the other regions, leading to an increase in total output; exports in both regions reduce, being 




available, and this leads to a reduction in domestic production and exports. As a result, USA and 
EU imports reduce; the reduction in imports is more than compensated by the increase in output for 
domestic consumption, leading to an increase in aggregate consumption.  
When labour taxes are unilaterally replaced in JAP, the region obtains losses of $0.3 billion 
(0.01% of GDP), whereas its terms of trade deteriorate 0.2% . This is comprised of a reduction in 
tax exporting of $0.5 billion, and an efficiency gain of $0.2 billion. In this case capital leaves the 
region, and hence there is a reduction in production. However, exports increase since factors of 
production reallocate towards manufactured goods. In the other regions, both production and 
exports increase because there is more capital available. Also these regions are better off as a result 
of the improvement in their terms of trade.  
In the scenario in which capital taxes are replaced there are stronger terms of trade and 
welfare effects (see Table 3). In this case, capital moves out of the regions where capital taxes are in 
place, in order to avoid the tax and into the region(s) eliminating the tax(es). This is accompanied 
by a reduction in the marginal product of capital in the receiving region relative to that of labour, 
since labour is in fixed supply. 
When capital taxes are unilaterally replaced by USA and EU, the welfare losses in these 
regions account for $5.1 and $6.6 billions, respectively, that is approximately 0.1% of GDP; the 
terms of trade worsen by 0.9% in USA and 1.2% in EU. These losses are comprised of $5.3 and 
$8.7 billion tax exporting effects (losses for the regions) and $0.3 and $2.2 billion efficiency gains. 
When capital taxes are replaced, the price of capital falls so that producers in USA and EU demand 
more of it. Hence, production increases as well as exports. In the other regions there is less capital 
available, and this leads to a reduction in domestic production and exports. As a result of this, USA 
and EU imports reduce, so that there is a reduction in aggregate consumption. As to the other 
regions, DAM benefits more when USA replaces its capital taxes than when EU does it; on the 
contrary, DAF benefits more when EU replaces its capital taxes (in fact, when USA replaces its 
taxes DAF loses $0.1 billions). 
The terms of trade of USA and EU deteriorate since the price of their exports is lower after 
the replacement of capital taxes, and the price of their imports has gone up (due to the reduction in 
production for exports in the other regions). Also, the improvement of DAM’s terms of trade is 
greater when USA replaces its taxes rather than EU (0.6% compared to 0.2%). The improvement of 





When JAP replaces capital taxes it obtains a welfare gain of 0.01% of GDP, despite the fact 
that the terms of trade of this region deteriorate by 1.9% (because its imports are now more 
expensive). These gains are comprised of a reduction in tax exporting of $8.9 billion (loss for the 
region) and $9.2 billion efficiency gain. JAP also attracts capital, hence there is an increase in 
production and an increase in exports. In the other regions, both production and exports reduce 
because there is less capital available. Also these regions (except DE) are better off as a result of the 
improvement in their terms of trade (especially DAS whose terms of trade improve 0.8%). 
When USA, JAP, EU and ODC simultaneously replace capital taxes, capital moves into 
JAP, EU and ODC; this result can be explained by the fact that these regions had higher taxes on 
the use of capital than USA. DAM, DAF and DAS benefit from the replacement of capital taxes in 
the developed regions, and there is an improvement in their terms of trade. 
Let us now consider the replacement of all factor taxes (Table 3). In this case, the results are 
dominated by what happens when capital taxes are replaced. When USA, JAP and EU unilaterally 
replace factor taxes, there is a welfare loss for these regions, accompanied by terms of trade 
deterioration (0.8%, 2.1% and 1.1%, respectively). These gains are comprised of a reduction in tax 
exporting of $2.2, $9.3, and $8.5 billion respectively, and $2.1 billion efficiency losses for USA 
whereas JAP and EU obtain $9.3 and $2.3 billion efficiency gains. These regions attract capital 
from all other regions. As to developing regions, DAM and DAS benefit from the replacement of 
the factor taxes in USA (their terms of trade improve 0.5% and 0.3%, respectively). When JAP 
replaces factor taxes DAM, DAF and DAS obtain welfare gains of $.0 2 billion (0.02% of GDP), 
$0.2 billion (0.05% of GDP), and $3.9 billion (0.26% of GDP) respectively; the terms of trade of 
these developing regions also improve, specially for DAS (0.8%). When EU replaces factor taxes, 
DAF benefits the most (welfare gains of $0.8 billion, and terms of trade improvement of 1%), 
followed by DAS and DAM. 
When all developed regions simultaneously replace factor taxes, the developing regions that 
benefit the most are DAF and DAS. DAF obtains a welfare gain of 1.8% of GDP ($5.9 billion) with 
a very small improvement in terms of trade (0.01%). DAS obtains a welfare gain of $9.3 billion 
(0.6% of GDP) and an improvement of 2.1% in terms of trade. DAM is also better off, but DE is 
worse off as a result of the deterioration in its terms of trade (0.7%). 
In conclusion, the results indicate that developed regions export factor taxes (especially on 
the use of capital) to developing regions, and that the magnitude of the effects depends upon 





Table 4 reports the case when import tariffs are replaced by a non distorting tax on final 
consumption. The regions replacing the tariffs suffer welfare losses and terms of trade worsening. A 
tariff lowers foreign export prices; the gain depends on the ability of the tariff-imposing country to 
drive down foreign export prices. Also notice that the effects of the replacement of import tariffs on 
welfare and terms of trade are larger than when factor taxes are replaced. 
When USA, JAP, and EU unilaterally eliminate and replace import tariffs, they suffer 
welfare losses and terms of trade deterioration. The welfare losses in these regions are due to 
efficiency losses that more than compensate for the positive tax exporting effect. In this scenario, 
capital moves out of these regions since this factor is cheaper elsewhere. There is an increase in 
exports, an increase in imports, a reduction in output for domestic consumption, and a reduction in 
aggregate consumption. All other regions benefit from the replacement of tariffs, both in terms of 
welfare and terms of trade improvement. In particular, when USA replaces tariffs DAM’s terms of 
trade improve by 0.8%; when tariffs are replaced in JAP, DAS’s terms of trade improve by 0.6%; 
and, DE and DAF’s terms of trade improve by 1.6% and 1.4%, respectively, when EU replaces its 
tariffs. 
When all developed regions replace tariffs simultaneously, all developing regions benefit 
both in terms of welfare and terms of trade improvement. 
The last four columns of Table 4 show the joint effects of the replacement of import tariffs 
and factor taxes. As can be seen, the results are qualitatively the same as when only import tariffs 
are replaced. Larger welfare losses are observed for developed regions when they unilaterally 
replace both import tariffs and factor taxes; there are also stronger terms of trade effects. The results 
are tariff dominated. 
The effects of the replacement of income taxes were also calculated. Results not reported 
here indicate that in this case there are small welfare gains (losses) and small terms of trade effects. 
When USA and EU eliminate income taxes, their welfare improves because of the elimination of a 
distortion in the economy, and there is also terms of trade improvement. These regions attract 
capital from the other regions. All other regions are worse off and their terms of trade deteriorate. In 
the case of JAP, it obtains losses of $0.2 billion (0.006% of GDP) as a result of the terms of trade 
deterioration (0.1%); capital leaves this region. All other regions benefit, although there are small 
effects on both welfare and terms of trade. When all developed regions simultaneously replace 
income taxes, capital moves out of USA, JAP, DAM and DAS. All developing regions and JAP 




The joint effects of the replacement of factor taxes, import tariffs and income taxes were 
also computed. Results not reported here indicate that the results are dominated by the effects of 
import tariffs. When USA, JAP and EU replace unilaterally all taxes, the region eliminating the 
taxes suffers terms of trade deterioration and welfare loss. When all developed regions eliminate all 
taxes, developing regions benefit. Lastly, when all regions simultaneously replace all taxes, 
developed regions benefit since imports tariffs are higher in developing regions; DAF and DE  
obtain welfare gains. 
  In summary, the results suggest that USA, JAP and EU export capital taxes to some 
particular developing regions. In the case of taxes on the use of labour and income taxes, the results 
appear to suggest that there is tax exporting from JAP to developing regions, although the effects on 
both welfare and terms of trade are small. Import tariffs are more important than domestic taxes in 
their effects on both welfare and terms of trade. 
We also performed a sensitivity analysis on the key elasticities of the model.
17 In particular, 
we look at the effects of a change in trade elasticities, since they determine the strength of the terms 
of trade effects associated with policy changes. In particular, the elasticity of substitution between 
import types and the elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and domestically 
produced goods are considered. It has been argued that the terms of trade effects increase when the 
elasticities of substitution between import types are smaller and the elasticities of substitution 
between comparable imported and domestically produced goods are larger. In addition, we report 
on the sensitivity of the results to changes in the elasticity of export transformation. 
In the model, the elasticities of substitution used are based on price elasticity estimates, 
since it was not possible to find econometric estimates of elasticities of substitution for CES 
demand functions. In the case of the elasticities of export transformation it was not possible to find 
econometric estimates; hence these parameters were calculated such that the elasticity of supply 
was equal to one. The elasticity of transformation indicates the difference among the goods 
exported to the other seven regions; the larger the elasticity, the more similar are the exported goods 
and vice-versa. Uniform values for these elasticities of 0.5, 1.5 and 3.0 are used in the sensitivity 
analysis; the first value is smaller than the one used in the model, whereas the last two values are 
larger. These elasticity values were chosen in order to consider extreme possibilities, that is very 
little substitution (or transformation) and almost infinite substitution (or transformation). We focus 
on the replacement of factor taxes and import tariffs, since these experiments have larger effects on 
both terms of trade and welfare. We conclude that the results are robust to the elasticity choice, in 
                                                 




the sense that there is evidence that USA, JAP and EU export factor taxes to the developing regions 
with which they have closer commercial ties. 
 
5.1 DIFFERENTIAL FACTOR TAX RATES 
From the available data it was not possible to calculate differential tax rates by industry. In reality, 
in each country there are differential tax rates for each sector in the economy. Hence, given that 
intersectoral effects may play an important role in tax exporting, it seems interesting to investigate 
whether the results of the model are altered when there are differential factor tax rates by industry.
18 
As an illustration, three counterfactual experiments were carried out: i) elimination and replacement 
of labour taxes; ii) elimination and replacement of capital taxes; and iii) elimination and 
replacement of all factor taxes. Each experiment is performed for USA, JAP, and EU individually, 
and for all developed regions simultaneously (i.e. USA, JAP, EU, and ODC). Similar to the 
previous experiments, existing factor taxes were replaced by an equal yield non-distorting tax on 
final expenditure within each region. Table 5 presents the results. 
The unilateral replacement of labour taxes generates welfare gains for the region replacing 
the taxes. As to developing regions, there are small losses as a result of the small terms of trade 
deterioration. However, when all developed regions simultaneously replace labour taxes, EU and 
ODC obtain welfare losses; developing countries also obtain welfare losses ranging from 0.1% of 
GDP in the case of DAM, to 1.3% of GDP in the case of DAF; terms of trade deteriorate 0.9% and 
1.6% respectively. In this case there is no tax exporting of labour taxes. 
If these results are compared with those obtained in the central case, differential taxation 
generates larger welfare gains (losses) and stronger terms of trade effects. For example, when USA 
replaces labour taxes, the region obtains welfare gains of 0.2% of GDP compared with 0.01% of 
GDP without differential taxation, and the region’s terms of trade improve 1.6% compared to 0.1%. 
As to developing countries, the deterioration in DAM’s terms of trade increases from 0.04%, 
without differential taxation, to 0.8%.  
When taxes on the use of capital are replaced, the region replacing the tax obtains welfare 
losses as a result of terms of trade deterioration. The region also attracts capital because this factor 
is now cheaper relative to labour. USA appears to be exporting capital taxes to DAM and DAS; JAP 
and EU export capital taxes to all developing regions but DE. When all developed regions 
                                                 






simultaneously replace capital taxes, DAM, DAF and DAS obtain welfare gains of 0.2%, 2.1% and 
1% of GDP, respectively, as a result of the terms of trade improvement. Comparing these results 
with those obtained without differential taxation, little change is observed in the case of USA but 
for the other regions there are larger welfare gains (losses) and stronger terms of trade effects. For 
example, in the case of JAP the replacement of capital taxes generates welfare losses of 0.2% of 
GDP whereas in the central case this region obtained welfare gains of 0.01% of GDP. JAP has the 
highest tax rates on the use of capital, and as a result of the elimination of these taxes this country 
attracts capital from all other regions, increasing the production of manufactured goods and in turn 
of exports. At the same time, imports from all other regions are reduced; hence the supply of goods 
for domestic consumption is reduced. There is also a deterioration of JAP’s terms of trade (4.4% 
compared with 1.9% without differential taxation) brought about by the reduction in the price of 
exports as a result of the reduction in the price of capital. 
Lastly, in the presence of differential tax rates, the welfare and terms of trade effects of the 
elimination of all factor taxes in USA are dominated by labour taxes (which are higher than capital 
taxes) whereas with uniform tax rates the results are dominated by capital taxes. By contrast, in the 
case of JAP and EU the results are dominated by capital taxes, as it was the case with uniform tax 
rates. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper has presented numerical results on the possibility that developed regions export domestic 
taxes to developing regions, particularly to those regions with which they have close commercial 
ties. We have used a general equilibrium model that incorporates domestic taxation and import 
tariffs of eight regions, chosen to represent world trade.  
The results of the model support the existence of tax exporting of capital taxes by USA, 
JAP and EU to some particular developing regions. In the case of taxes on the use of labour and 
income taxes, the results indicate that there is tax exporting from JAP to developing regions, 
although the effects on both welfare and terms of trade are small. In this case, once again, import 
tariffs are more important than domestic taxes in their effects on both welfare and terms of trade.  
  The effects that differential factor tax rates might have on the results of the model were also 
considered. Stronger terms of trade effects and larger welfare gains (losses) were found, and this 
confirms that intersectoral effects are very important for tax exporting. In particular, more taxes 
could be exported if a region taxes more heavily those industries that constitute their main exports, 




  It is not possible to say that policies in developed regions affect all developing regions in 
the same way. Policies will have stronger effects on those regions with which there are close 
commercial ties; for example, USA will mainly affect DAM, JAP will mainly affect DAS, and EU 
will mainly affect DAF and to a lesser extent DE. 
In the light of these results, it could be suggested that the possibility of tax exporting of 
domestic taxes will become a more important part in trade negotiations as international markets 
become more integrated. Capital markets are becoming more international in scope; international 
migration is highly constraint and very selective; hence it will still take considerable time to reduce 
restrictions to labour mobility. At the moment, tariffs are low in developed countries and the 
benefits of any further reductions could be dampened by higher domestic factor taxes, which can be 




Table 1: Regional classification 
Region 1: USA  United States       
Region 2: JAP  Japan       
Region 3: EU  Belgium     Denmark  France  Germany 
  Greece      Ireland  Italy  Luxembourg 
   Netherlands      Portugal  Spain  United Kingdom 
Region 4: ODC  Australia      Austria  Canada  Finland 
  Iceland      Israel  New Zealand  Norway 
   South Africa      Sweden  Switzerland 
Region 5: DAM  Antigua & Barbuda   Argentina  Barbados  Belize 
  Bolivia      Brazil  Chile  Colombia 
  Costa Rica      Dominica  Dominican Rep.  Ecuador 
  El Salvador      Grenada  Guatemala  Guyana 
   Haiti      Honduras  Jamaica  Mexico 
  Nicaragua      Panama  Paraguay  Peru 
  St. Lucia      St.Kits & Nevis  Suriname  Uruguay 
  Trinidad & Tobago    Venezuela  St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Region 6: DAF  Algeria      Angola  Benin  Botswana 
  Burkina Faso      Burundi  Cameroon  Cape Verde 
  Central African Rep.  Chad  Comoros  Congo 
  Cote d’Ivoire      Djibouti  Egypt  Equatorial Guinea 
  Ethiopia      Gabon  Gambia  Ghana 
  Guinea      Guinea-Bissau  Kenya  Lesotho 
  Madagascar      Malawi  Mali  Mauritania 
  Mauritius      Morocco  Mozambique  Namibia 
  Niger       Nigeria  Reunion  Rwanda 
   Sao Tome & Principe  Senegal  Seychelles  Sierra Leone 
   Sudan       Swaziland  Togo  Tunisia 
   Uganda       Tanzania  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
Region 7: DAS  Bahrain       Bhutan  Bangladesh  China 
  Hong Kong       India  Indonesia  Iran (Islamic Rep) 
   Jordan       Kuwait  Laos  Lebanon 
   Malaysia       Mongolia  Myanmar  Nepal 
   Oman       Pakistan  Philippines  Qatar 
   Rep. of Korea       Saudi Arabia  Singapore  Sri Lanka 
   Syrian Arab Rep.       Taiwan  Thailand  Yemen 
   United Arab Emirates     
Region 8: DE  Bulgaria       Croatia  Cyprus  Czech Rep. 
  Estonia       Hungary  Malta  Poland 
  Romania       Slovenia  Turkey  USSR (former) 





Table 2: Elasticities in the model 
 Regions 
Elasticity  USA  JAP  EU ODC  DAM DAF DAS  DE 
σ           
Primary  Commodities  0.70 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.70 
Manufactured  goods  0.78 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.90 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Services  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ρ           
Primary  Commodities  -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 
Manufactured  goods  -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 
Services  -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 -0.95 
ε           
Primary  Commodities  -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 
Manufactured  goods  -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 
Services  -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 
υ           
Primary  Commodities  0.92 0.93 0.86 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.55 2.72 
Manufactured  goods  0.92 0.93 0.86 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.55 2.72 
Services  0.92 0.93 0.86 0.95 1.26 1.02 1.55 2.72 
ζ           
Primary  Commodities  0.99 0.93 0.92 1.13 0.54 0.57 1.23 1.41 
Manufactured  goods  0.99 0.93 0.92 1.13 0.54 0.57 1.23 1.41 
Services  0.99 0.93 0.92 1.13 0.54 0.57 1.23 1.41 
 
     Notes: 
σ  is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour; based on estimates presented in 
Whalley (1985). 
ρ  is the elasticity of transformation for domestic output; taken from de Janvry et. al. (1991). 
ε  is the elasticity of transformation for exports. These elasticities appear to be identical when 
the figures are rounded to two decimal places. 
υ  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. This elasticity was 
set equal to literature-survey import price elasticities. Within any region, the same value is 
used for all commodity-substitution possibilities.  
ζ  is the elasticity of substitution between regional imports. This elasticity was set equal to 
literature-survey export price elasticities. Within any region, the same value is used for all 
commodity-substitution possibilities. 
 





Table 3: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield tax replacement 
 of existing factor taxes 
($ billions) 
 
Replacement  Taxes on labour  Taxes on capital  All factor taxes 
of  taxes  in:  EV TEE DWL TOT  EV TEE  DWL TOT  EV TEE  DWL TOT 
              
1. USA               
USA  0.72  2.55  -1.83  0.10% -5.07 -5.33  0.26  -0.87% -4.37 -2.23 -2.15  -0.77% 
JAP  -0.12 -8.08  7.96  -0.04% -0.79  3.16 -3.95  0.12% -0.91 -5.24  4.34  0.09% 
EU  -0.20 -3.18  2.98  -0.03% -0.53  1.27 -1.80  0.01% -0.72 -2.04  1.32  -0.01% 
ODC  -0.13 4.62 -4.76  -0.02% 1.78 0.41 1.37  0.37% 1.66 4.99  -3.34  0.35% 
DAM  -0.07 1.15 -1.22  -0.04% 0.80 0.48 0.32  0.57% 0.73 1.58  -0.85  0.53% 
DAF  -0.02 -0.91  0.89  -0.01% -0.09  0.35 -0.44  -0.01% -0.11 -0.59  0.48  -0.03% 
DAS  -0.10  10.00  -10.10  -0.02% 1.06  -2.57 3.63  0.29% 0.96 7.69  -6.73  0.26% 
DE  -0.01 -6.15  6.14  -0.01% -0.15  2.49 -2.64  -0.05% -0.16 -3.91  3.76  -0.06% 
Total  0.06  0.00  0.06   -2.98  0.27 -3.25   -2.92  0.24 -3.17   
              
2. JAP               
USA  0.22 0.21  0.01  0.04% 2.52 2.98  -0.46  0.48% 2.73 3.18  -0.44  0.51% 
JAP  -0.31 -0.54  0.23  -0.17%  0.34 -8.86  9.20  -1.90% -0.03 -9.35  9.32  -2.06% 
EU  0.18 0.15  0.03  0.02% 1.01 1.34  -0.34  0.17% 1.17 1.48  -0.31  0.19% 
ODC  0.04 0.05 -0.01  0.01% 0.71 0.83  -0.12  0.16% 0.75 0.88  -0.12  0.16% 
DAM  0.01 0.01 -0.00  0.01% 0.22 0.23  -0.01  0.15% 0.23 0.24  -0.01  0.16% 
DAF  0.01 0.00  0.00  0.01% 0.15 0.21  -0.06  0.16% 0.16 0.21  -0.05  0.16% 
DAS  0.12 0.12  0.00  0.02% 3.78 3.84  -0.07  0.75% 3.90 3.96  -0.06  0.77% 
DE  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00% -0.18  0.16 -0.33  -0.07% -0.17  0.15 -0.33  -0.06% 
Total  0.27 0.00  0.27   8.55 0.73 7.82   8.74 0.75 7.99   
              
3. EU               
USA  -0.03 -0.03  0.00  0.00% -0.55 -0.08 -0.48  -0.05% -0.58 -0.10 -0.48  -0.06% 
JAP  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00% -1.24 -0.38 -0.86  -0.10% -1.23 -0.37 -0.85  -0.10% 
EU  0.43  0.28  0.15  0.04% -6.58 -8.74  2.16  -1.17% -6.19 -8.46  2.27  -1.13% 
ODC  -0.05  -0.04 -0.01  -0.01% 6.00 6.69  -0.69  1.17% 5.95 6.65  -0.70  1.16% 
DAM  -0.03  -0.03 -0.01  -0.02% 0.18 0.30  -0.12  0.16% 0.14 0.27  -0.13  0.14% 
DAF  -0.08  -0.07 -0.01  -0.06% 0.91 1.03  -0.13  1.09% 0.83 0.97  -0.14  1.03% 
DAS  -0.06  -0.07  0.01  -0.02% 2.81 2.98  -0.17  0.65% 2.76 2.92  -0.16  0.63% 
DE  -0.06 -0.06  0.00  -0.04% -1.39 -1.30 -0.09  -0.55% -1.45 -1.36 -0.09  -0.59% 
Total  0.13 0.00  0.13   0.14 0.50  -0.37   0.23 0.51  -0.28   
               
4. USA, JAP, EU, ODC             
USA  0.58 2.65 -2.06  0.13% 1.11 0.97 0.15  0.13% 1.75 3.37  -1.62  0.22% 
JAP  -0.46 -8.39  7.93  -0.21% -0.22 -5.18  4.96  -1.44% -0.73  -13.22 12.49  -1.65% 
EU  1.01 -2.27  3.28  0.11% -1.12 -1.96  0.83  -0.33% -1.16 -4.86  3.71  -0.34% 
ODC  0.99  5.31  -4.32  0.15% -1.89 -1.45 -0.44  -0.37% -1.04  4.01 -5.05  -0.24% 
DAM  -0.07 1.13 -1.20  -0.04% 1.20 0.99 0.21  0.90% 1.09 2.00  -0.92  0.83% 
DAF  4.56  -2.28  6.84  -1.50% 6.01 5.58 0.44  0.10% 5.91  -0.58 6.49  0.01% 
DAS  0.03 9.87 -9.84  0.00% 9.44 3.53 5.90  2.16% 9.33  15.27  -5.94  2.13% 
DE  -0.02 -6.01  5.99  -0.02% -1.84 -3.14  1.30  -0.60% -1.95 -5.07  3.12  -0.68% 
Total  6.62  0.01  6.61   12.69 -0.66 13.35   13.20  0.92 12.27   
EV: Equivalent Variation; TEE: Tax Exporting Effect; DWL: Deadweight gain (or loss); TOT: Percentage 
change Terms of Trade. 




Table 4: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield tax replacement 
 of existing import tariffs and factor taxes 
($ billions) 
 
Replacement  Import Tariffs  Import tariffs and factor taxes 
of taxes in:  EV  TEE  DWL  TOT  EV  TEE  DWL  TOT 
               
1. USA               
USA  -13.11  20.28 -33.40  -1.81%  -71.72  16.28 -88.00  -2.58% 
JAP  2.35  2.88  -0.53 0.61%  1.37  -2.64  4.01 0.69% 
EU  4.40  4.14 0.26  0.53%  3.54  1.71 1.83  0.51% 
ODC  2.22  1.02  1.20 0.32%  3.80  5.96  -2.16 0.67% 
DAM  1.48  1.04  0.44 0.82%  2.17  2.55  -0.38 1.35% 
DAF  0.66  0.64 0.02  0.46%  0.52  -0.01 0.54  0.43% 
DAS  1.83  0.16  1.68 0.41%  2.73  7.87  -5.14 0.67% 
DE  0.34  1.12  -0.78 0.23%  0.17  -2.92  3.08 0.17% 
Total  0.17  31.28 -31.12    -57.42  28.80 -86.23   
               
2. JAP               
USA  1.59  1.41  0.18 0.25%  4.25  4.51  -0.26 0.76% 
JAP  -5.88  7.66  -13.54 -2.03%  -5.55  -2.05  -3.49 -4.08% 
EU  1.28  1.05  0.23 0.15%  2.36  2.45  -0.09 0.34% 
ODC  0.51  0.39  0.13 0.07%  1.22  1.25  -0.03 0.23% 
DAM  0.24  0.20 0.04  0.13%  0.45  0.43 0.02  0.29% 
DAF  0.09  0.07 0.02  0.07%  0.27  0.27 0.00  0.23% 
DAS  2.23  1.94 0.28  0.55%  5.96  5.82 0.13  1.31% 
DE  0.15  0.10  0.05 0.10%  -0.04  0.22  -0.26 0.03% 
Total  0.20  12.82  -12.62  8.93  12.90  -3.98  
               
3. EU               
USA  4.05  3.61  0.44 0.64%  3.40  3.41  -0.01 0.57% 
JAP  1.85  1.30  0.55 0.52%  0.56  0.83  -0.27 0.41% 
EU  -18.08  30.13 -48.21  -2.06%  -23.66  20.80 -44.47  -3.19% 
ODC  3.23  2.43 0.80  0.46%  9.04  9.03 0.01  1.64% 
DAM  1.16  0.93 0.22  0.63%  1.24  1.18 0.06  0.77% 
DAF  2.00  1.52 0.49  1.39%  2.76  2.47 0.29  2.48% 
DAS  2.57  2.41  0.16 0.61%  5.21  5.31  -0.10 1.24% 
DE  2.49  2.28 0.20  1.55%  0.91  0.79 0.12  0.95% 
Total  -0.73  44.62 -45.35    -0.54  43.83 -44.37   
               
4. USA, JAP, EU, ODC             
USA  -4.05  28.09 -32.14  -0.41%  -1.86  28.38 -30.24  -0.25% 
JAP  -0.59  12.68  -13.26 -0.66%  -1.39  -2.43  1.05 -2.36% 
EU  -5.36  40.95 -46.31  -0.62%  -6.98  30.75 -37.73  -1.13% 
ODC  -8.20  25.01 -33.21  -1.02%  -9.66  26.27 -35.93  -1.28% 
DAM  3.31  2.50  0.81 1.83%  4.23  4.36  -0.13 2.69% 
DAF  7.63  0.90 6.72  0.66%  8.79  1.68 7.11  2.20% 
DAS  7.62  5.29  2.33 1.79%  16.52  20.45  -3.93 3.93% 
DE  3.69  4.23  -0.54 2.37%  1.43  -1.48  2.91 1.63% 
Total  4.05  119.65  -115.60   11.08  107.98  -96.90  
EV: Equivalent Variation; TEE: Tax Exporting Effect; DWL: Deadweight gain (or loss); TOT: Percentage 
change Terms of Trade. 




Table 5: Welfare and terms of trade effects of an equal-yield 
 tax replacement of factor taxes in the presence of differential tax rates 
($ billions) 
 
Replacement  Taxes on labour  Taxes on capital  All factor taxes 
of taxes in:  EV   TOT  EV  TOT  EV  TOT 
        
1. USA        
USA 10.55  1.55%  -5.01  -0.81%  5.95  0.72% 
JAP -0.86  -0.29%  -1.00  0.02%  -1,843  -0.27% 
EU -2.50  -0.33%  -0.58  0.01%  -3.07  -0.31% 
ODC -2.63  -0.49%  1.90  0.10%  -0.73  -0.08% 
DAM -1.18  -0.76%  0.79  0.56%  -0.38  -0.19% 
DAF  -0.12 -0.11%  -0.12 -0.05%  -0.24 -0.16% 
DAS -1.61  -0.37%  0.86  0.25%  -0.76  -0.11% 
DE  -0.02 -0.14%  -0.21 -0.10%  -0.22 -0.11% 
Total  1,64   -3.36   -1.29  
          
2. JAP          
USA  -2.67  -0.44%  5.36 0.91%  2.70 0.50% 
JAP  7.94  2.55%  -6.91 -4.39%  2.11 -1.98% 
EU  -1.55  -0.21%  2.61 0.37%  1.08 0.18% 
ODC  -0.69  -0.13%  1.45 0.28%  0.75 0.16% 
DAM  -0.27  -0.17%  0.48 0.30%  0.23 0.15% 
DAF  -0.13  -0.12%  2.76 0.26%  0.16 0.16% 
DAS  -2.96  -0.69%  6.75 1.40%  3.71 0.74% 
DE  -0.05 -0.05%  -0.12 -0.02%  -0.17 -0.06% 
Total  -0.36   12.39   10.56  
          
3. EU          
USA  -0.02 0.00%  1.62 0.26%  1.61 0.26% 
JAP  -0.01 0.00%  -0.51 0.12%  -0.51 0.12% 
EU  0.06  0.00%  -14.28 -2.47%  -14.26 -2.47% 
ODC  0.09 0.02%  9.42 1.80%  9.50 1.82% 
DAM  -0.02  -0.01%  0.65 0.44%  0.63 0.43% 
DAF  0.01 0.03%  1.71 1.75%  1.72 1.78% 
DAS  -0.09  -0.02%  4.86 1.11%  4.77 1.10% 
DE  -0.04 -0.02%  -0.90 -0.14%  -0.95 -0.16% 
Total  -0.02   2.56   2.50  
          
4. USA, JAP, EU, ODC         
USA  7.71 1.11%  7.99 1.27%  16.00 2.38% 
JAP  7.18  2.30%  -6.90 -3.93%  1.06 -1.75% 
EU  -3.17 -0.43%  -4.41 -1.11%  -8.59 -1.64% 
ODC  -2.84 -0.57%  -2.14 -0.48%  -5.11 -1.07% 
DAM  -1.42  -0.92%  2.08 1.41%  0.58 0.46% 
DAF  4.45  -1.61%  7.05 0.89%  6.81 0.71% 
DAS  -4.51  -1.03%  14.71 3.35%  9.92 2.28% 
DE  -0.04 -0.05%  -1.16 -0.03%  -1.30 -0.13% 
Total  7.36   17.22   19.37  
     EV: Equivalent Variation; TOT: Percentage change Terms of Trade. 




Appendix 1: Model equations and notation 
 
Production side of the model 

























−− − γδ δ
σσ σσ σσ [( ) ]
() / () / /( ) 11 1 1   [A.1] 
•  Domestic and foreign sales 
























−− − ϕβ β
ρρ ρρ ρρ [( ) ]
() / () / /( ) 11 1 1  [A.2] 

























θ ν = ∑
ε − ε
 , s ≠  r  [A.3] 
Demand side of the model 
























α = ∑  [A.4] 
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 ω − + ω Ω =
υ − υ υ − υ
 [A.5] 
























χ ψ = ∑ , s ≠  r  [A.6] 
Constraints 
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= ∑ ∑  [A.9] 
Zero profit conditions 
  In each region the value of domestic output in sector i must be equal to the capital and 
labour costs of producing good i. At the same time, the value of domestic output in sector i equals 
the value of commodities sold in the domestic market plus the value of commodities sold as 
















i , DC L P K P EXP P DC P + = + . [A.10] 
  The value of commodities sold as exports must equal the value of the sum of exports to the 









i , X RX P EXP P ∑ = ,  s ≠  r  [A.11] 









i , M DIMP P IMP P ∑ = , s ≠  r  [A.12] 
The value of the composite commodity i demanded by consumers must equal the value of 










i r , i DOM P IMP P CMP P
*
+ =  [A.13] 
The value of goods sold for domestic consumption must be equal to the value of the 













i , DC P P =  [A.14] 
The value of exports from region r to region s must be equal to the value of imports of 




















Market clearing conditions 
•  Goods markets 
  The supply of goods for domestic consumption must equal the demand for domestically 




i DOM DC =  [A.16] 
  Exports from region r to region s must equal imports of region s from region r because 





i DIMP RX =   [A.17] 
    Total supply of composite commodities, which consists of the composite of similar 




i X CMP =  [A.18] 
•  Factor markets 








i L L   [A.19] 








i K K  [A.20] 












i K K  [A.20a] 
 
Equations for price relationships 







i , M 1 P P
*
τ + =  [A.21] 
•  Factor prices 
( )
r
i , K r , K
r
i , K t 1 P P + =  [A.22] 
( )
r
i , L r , L
r





•  Consumer prices 
( )
r
i , C r , i
r
i t 1 P P + =  [A.24] 
 
List of variables 
Qi
r
  Value added good i region r.  
r
i L   Labour input good i region r. 
r
i K   Capital input good i region r. 
DCi
r    Output for domestic consumption good i region r. 
EXPi
r  Output for exports good i region r.  
s , r
i RX   Exports of good i from region r to region s. 
U
r  Consumer utility region r. 
Xi
r
  Consumer demand good i region r. 
r
i CMP  Total supply of good i region r. 
r
i IMP   Total imports good i region r. 
r
i DOM   Domestic output for domestic for consumption good i region r. 
s , r
i DIMP  Imports good i region r from to region s. 
I
r   Income region r. 
E
r  Expenditure region r 
TR
r   Government transfers region r. 
TB
r  Trade surplus or deficit region r. 
T
r   Income tax paid by consumers region r. 
PL,r   Selling prices of labour region r. 
r
L P   Producer price labour input good i region r. 
PK,r   Selling prices of capital region r.  
r
K P   Producer price capital input good i region r. 
Pir ,   Gross price of consumer good i region r. 
r
i P   Price paid by consumers for good i region r. 
* r





i , M P   Gross price of imports good i region r. 
r
i , X P   Price of exports good i region r. 
r
i , DC P   Price goods sold for domestic consumption good i region r. 
s , r
i , RX P   Price of good i exported from region r to region s. 
r
i , DOM P  Price good i for domestic consumption region r. 
s , r
i , DIMP P  Price of good i imported by region r from region s. 
 
List of parameters 
γ i
r    Scale parameter value added function, good i region r. 
δ i
r   Share parameter value added function, good i region r. 
σ i
r    Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, good i region r. 
ϕ i
r    Scale parameter exports and domestic sales function, good i region r. 
β i
r    Share parameter exports and domestic sales function, good i region r. 
ρ i
r    Elasticity of transformation between domestic output, good i region r. 
ν i
r    Scale parameter export allocation function, good i region r. 
θ i
r   Share parameter export allocation function, good i region r. 
r
i ε   Elasticity of transformation between regional exports, good i region r. 
α i
r    Share parameter utility function, good i region r. 
µ
r   Elasticity of substitution in consumption region r. 
r
i Ω   Scale parameter domestic and import consumption function, good i region r. 
r
i ω   Share parameter domestic and import consumption function, good i region r. 
r
i υ   Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported consumption, good i region r. 
r
i ψ   Scale parameter import allocation function, good i region r. 
r
i χ   Share parameter import allocation function, good i region r. 
r
i ζ   Elasticity of substitution between regional imports, good i region r. 




Kr    Endowment of capital region r. 
r t   Tax rate on income region r. 
r
i τ  Tax rate on imports good i region r. 
r
i , C t   Tax rate on consumption good i region r. 
r
i , K t   Tax rate on capital (i.e. corporate and property taxes) region r. 
r
i , L t   Tax rate on labour (i.e. payroll tax and social security contributions) region r. 
r




Appendix 2: Armington elasticities in the model 
 
These elasticities are the elasticity of substitution between comparable imported and domestically 
produced goods (υ ), and the elasticity of substitution between imports forming import composites 
(ζ ). The former was set equal to literature estimates of import price elasticities. The latter was set 
equal to literature estimates of export price elasticities. Within each region the same values are 
assumed for all commodity-substitution possibilities. 
•  For USA and JAP these elasticities were obtained from Marquez (1990).  
•  For EU these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of the following countries 
(sources in parentheses): Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands (Stern et al, 1976); Germany and the United Kingdom (Marquez, 1990); and 
Portugal (Houthakker and Magee, 1969). 
•  For ODC these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of the following 
countries (sources in parentheses): Canada (Marquez, 1990); Austria, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand (Stern et. al., 1976). 
•  For DAM these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay, as taken from Khan (1974).
19  
•  For DAF these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of Ghana and Morocco, 
as taken from Khan (1974). 
•  For DAS these elasticities correspond to the averages of the elasticities of the following 
countries (sources in parentheses): India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka (Khan, 1974); and 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (Nguyen and Bhuyan, 1977).
20 
•  Lastly, for DE I use the elasticities for Turkey estimated by Khan (1974). 
 
The elasticities used in the model are presented in Table 2 in the text. 
 
                                                 
19 The export price elasticity of Uruguay is not included in the computation of the average elasticity for DAM 
since it was not available.  
20 The export price elasticity of the Philippines is not included in the computation of the average elasticity for 
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